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ABSTRACT 
Industry Hedging and Firm Risk Management 
Zhen Wang 
This thesis investigates the effect of the level of competition and the level of hedging within the 
industry upon individual firms' foreign exchange risk management behavior as well as firm value 
for a sample of 387 US firms in the S&P 1500. This is addressed by using an extensive set of 
hand-collected data that measures the extent of industry and firm hedging of exchange rate risk 
over the three year period from 2003 to 2005 and by constructing variables that capture the effect of 
competition and industry level hedging. The results suggest that the hedging level of the industry 
has no effect on firm value. However, the study verifies that a firm's competitive incentive to hedge 
will increase when most competitors decide to hedge. 
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Chapter I, Introduction 
Risk management has recently gained much attention due to high volatility in the 
international financial markets. Researchers, analysts, and investors have extensively 
discussed firm's hedging decisions. As implied by the classic Modigliani and Miller 
(1987) paper on firm value in perfect capital markets, risk management is irrelevant 
to firm value. In addition, according to Smith and Stulz (1985), hedging is costly and 
is unnecessary as in the long run the losses and gains from currency fluctuations 
would offset. 
On the other hand, research on the practical imperfections in capital markets show 
that hedging strategies should have a positive effect on firm value. Recent studies 
document that the firm values of non-users of derivatives are lower than those of 
derivative users (Allayannis and Weston, 2001). Various theories relate the value of 
hedging to financial distress costs, agency costs, bankruptcy costs, taxes, costly 
external financing, incomplete contracting and asymmetric information. More 
specifically, corporate hedging can alleviate many unsystematic risks by reducing the 
volatility of cash flows, and it can accommodate the risk aversion of undiversified 
managers. (Aretz K, Bartram S and Dufey G, 2007) 
Furthermore, exchange rate risk is generally regarded as unsystematic, and even if it 
is systematic investors can themselves hedge the risk. (John Dobson, Luc Soenen, 
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1993) However, there is business risk which is difficult and often impossible to 
diversify and arises from uncertainties with respect to financial risks. Like, lower 
volatility of cash flows also leads to lower bankruptcy costs. (Aretz K, Bartram S and 
Dufey G, 2007) As a result, hedging has some impact on firm value, as investors can 
not always achieve risk reduction themselves through diversification. 
The corporate use of derivatives including forwards and options, as a means of 
managing risks facing corporations, has increased steadily. In the business world, 
foreign currency hedging is considered to be a major strategic decision that can 
considerably affect profitability and risk management. Not only multinationals but 
also domestic firms are greatly affected by the volatility of foreign exchange rates. In 
recent years, investors have increasingly started to expect management to be able to 
identify and to manage their firm's exposure to such market risks. However, mainly 
due to the lack of public databases that provide information on the risk management 
activities, no widely-accepted theories have been established until now and it remains 
unclear whether their choices determine their hedge activities. 
A, Research Topic 
Brown (2001) implies that foreign currency hedging programs mitigate the negative 
effect of currency fluctuations on competitive markets. In a competitive industry, 
firms will be better off hedging foreign exchange risk. Therefore, firm value may 
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depend on the firm's competitive ability. If a firm's profit is more volatile, the firm 
will have lower competitive ability and firm value will decrease compared to its 
competitors. It is possible that changes in foreign exchange rates affect the systematic 
risk of the company. The underlying reason is that investors dislike uncertainty in 
profitability. Even if changes in foreign exchange rates affect only the unsystematic 
risk of the company, the company may want to hedge to reduce the possibility that it 
is unable to make payments on its debt—to avoid the risk of insolvency and resulting 
financial distress costs. The investor may not be able to eliminate this risk by 
diversification. 
Suppose the industry sells its output to a foreign country and the price is denominated 
in the foreign currency unit (FCU). Competitive pressures in the industry make a 
single firm unable to change the prices that it charges without adverse effects. 
However, the output price may basically be influenced by the majority of competitors 
behaving similarly and may increase if the FCU decreases in value and decrease if 
the FCU increases in value. Let Company A represents a firm which belongs to this 
majority group which does not hedge. It means that most of competitors in its 
industry facing similar currency risks do not choose to hedge against FCU 
depreciation, they all will have the same cash flow fluctuations. Company B is a firm 
which hedges. If the foreign currency goes up in value relative to the domestic 
currency, the output price goes down. The profit of A will be unchanged but the profit 
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of B will decrease. If the foreign currency goes down in value, the output price goes 
up. The profit of A will be unchanged but the profit of B will increase. Therefore, 
while B hedges to reduce the uncertainty in its profits due to foreign exchange rate 
fluctuations, because the output price changes with the foreign exchange rate, the 
effect of hedging is nullified. 
In contrast, considering the reverse situation in which Company A, which belongs to 
the majority group, hedges while Company B does not hedge, the correlation between 
prices and costs within the industry will be largely discounted. Thus competitiveness 
and the firm value of Company A is unaffected by currency fluctuation. If that is the 
case, then Company B, as an un-hedged firm, is exposed to relatively greater profit 
uncertainty. This higher earnings variability would hurt the firm's value, and would 
increase the firm's incentive to hedge. 
In light of these scenarios, this thesis assumes that competitive considerations affect 
firm value and hypothesizes that the decision to hedge will be contingent on whether 
the firm's competitors also face foreign exchange exposure and whether they engage 
in foreign currency risk management. In other words, we assume that a firm's value 
and risk management behavior depend not only on its own hedging decisions, but 
also on the hedging decisions of its competitors. Firms with foreign exchange rate 
risks will follow the majority of hedge decisions of firms in the industry to reduce the 
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possibility that it is unable to make payments on its debt—to avoid the risk of 
insolvency and resulting financial distress costs. To sum up, a firm's incentive to 
hedge will increase when its competitors decide to hedge. 
B. Research Objectives 
Among the extant theories concerning the motives for corporate risk management, 
most concentrate on managerial incentives or market imperfections. Conflicting 
empirical conclusions are found using cross-sectional evidence, regarding the 
importance of derivatives portfolios in managing corporations' financial risk. In fact, 
the competitive structure of an industry is positively related to a firm's exchange rate 
exposure. However, few studies account for the effect that industry hedging may have 
on an individual firm's value or on its decision to hedge. 
A Cournot-Oligopoly model (Allaz. and Vila, 1993) shows that prices are expected to 
positively co-vary with exchange related costs in competitive industries. As the 
degree of currency hedging in an industry rises, prices show less response to foreign 
exchange rates, producing more random profits. Since uncertainty in profits is 
undesirable, the decision to stay un-hedged will have an unfavorable impact on 
expected profits if a higher portion of competitors are hedged. Consequently, firms 
are more prone to hedge currency risk if a higher fraction of their rivals do so, even 
after controlling for industry level exposures to currency risk. 
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Thus, the objective of this study is to provide insight into the impact of hedging 
activities on firm value, given the level of a firm's foreign sales and the level of 
industry hedging. It is expected that the greater the degree of hedging in an industry, 
the greater the benefits of hedging activity to a firm. 
Another objective is to check whether the hedging decisions of a firm's rivals 
contribute to its decision to hedge, if necessity for hedging arises. It is predicted that 
a firm's derivatives usage relies not only on its own risk exposure and its decision to 
hedge, but also on the level of hedging activities by other firms in the same industry. 
C. Expected Contribution 
Contribution 1 
Until now there is only limited empirical evidence on how a firm's risk management 
choice and its value are affected by the hedging decisions of other firms in the same 
Industry, as the recent finance literature focuses mostly on firm specific motives and 
the potential value derived from corporate hedging. Therefore, the study will 
contribute to the literature by showing the effect of competition on the value of a firm 
as well as its risk management choice. More specifically, we show that a firm's 
incentive to hedge increases as its main competitors hedge, and that its incentive 
decreases as its competitors choose not to hedge. Our empirical model generates 
potentially testable implications and provides meaningful empirical results regarding 
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the competitive motives of risk management. 
Contribution 2 
In addition, this paper adds value to the existing empirical research in that area by 
simultaneously examining both the hedging need of a firm and the degree to which 
the firm actually hedges. Nain (2005) focuses on the effect of hedging on firm value 
given the hedging level in the industry. Nevertheless, the impact of the degree of 
hedging on a firm's value and the need for that firm to hedge are ignored. Why these 
factors are essential to this model can be explained by a simple example whose sales 
include 5% in foreign sales. The impact of the industry hedging level is small 
compared to a firm whose foreign sales account for 95% of its total sales. In this 
paper, the impact of hedging on firm value given the hedging level in an industry is 
tested empirically. Our results are expected to show that the value of a firm that has a 
high level of foreign exchange risk exposure and operates in an industry with a high 
ievei of hedging, is adversely affected if it does not hedge. A further test will 
determine whether the hedging decisions of its competitors has any effect on a firm's 
decision to hedge if there is a need for hedging. 
Contribution 3 
A further contribution is that the methodology of this study will take into account 
both hedging practices and the level of competition in various industries. Geczy, 
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Minion and Schrand (1997) study a sample of Fortune 500 non-financial firms. 
Allayannis and Weston (2001) focus their research on non-financial firms with total 
assets of more than 500 million. Up to now most empirical tests of hedging behavior 
only explain a small fraction of the within-industry deviation in hedging practices. 
The problem comes from studying a single industry or using a small sample size. 
Therefore, the paper adds to the literature by examining the hedging activities of 
firms Listed in the Standard & Poor's 1500 Composite Index, and by separately 
examining large cap, medium cap and small cap firms. 
a. Implications for Managers and Investors 
This paper presents an analytical description of the competitive motives for hedging, 
seeks to measure the impact of industry hedging levels on firm value and provides 
some insight into appropriateness of certain risk management decisions for managers. 
Managers should act on behalf of the company and investors. Our findings suggest that 
it is vital for managers to make decisions based not only on the company's own 
conditions and needs, but also to pay close attention to hedging activities by the firm's 
competitors in the same industry. A firm's failure to consider the actions taken by its 
competitors will likely cause it to lose value. Specifically, if a firm ignores its 
competitors' activities, its investors will require a higher rate of return to compensate 
them for the higher variability in the firm's cash flows and earnings, resulting in a 
lower stock price, 
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b. Implications for Researchers 
This paper will accumulate existing theoretical and empirical literature in a system 
that allows for a consistent analysis of how a firm's value is affected by the level of 
hedging within its industry. Researchers can also use this model when considering the 
design and implementation of empirical studies. Managers' decisions have a direct 
and indirect effect on the profitability of the company, which, together with the 
investors' expected rate of return, determines firm value. If a firm is un-hedged in an 
industry which otherwise exhibits a high level of hedging activity, the company's 
value will likely be adversely affected. Researchers interested in the outcome of 
hedging within a given industry should consider how to measure the relationship 
between firm value and industry effect. 
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Chapter II. Literature Review 
A. The Link between Hedging and Firm Value 
A new measure of risk management activity - the delta percentage is developed by 
Tufano (1996), His results suggest that firms engage in hedging activities not only to 
boost firms' value but also to increase the manager's utility. However, the sample size 
used in Tufano's paper is comparatively small, so that the paper's empirical findings 
may be biased. Allayannis and Weston (2001) first observe the possible effects of 
foreign currency derivatives use on firm value in a sample of 720 large, non-financial 
U.S firms from 1990 to 1995. Their findings indicate that the firms realize a 
statistically and economically significant premium in terms of hedging activities, and 
that hedging causes a firm's value to increase. On the other hand, Guay and Kothari 
(2003) employ a different approach by regressing market value sensitivities on the 
determinants of derivatives usage. The reports show that the risk exposure hedged by 
financial derivatives constitutes only a small portion of the overall risk profile for the 
sample of 234 large non-financial firms and that hedging has a limited impact on firm 
value. 
The finance literature demonstrates that the improved firm value from hedging is 
related to the costs of financial distress, contracting costs, the costs of raising external 
capita], taxes, and underinvestment problems. Smith and Stulz (1985) suggest that 
firms use derivatives to reduce the volatility of earnings since they have incentives to 
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reduce the possibility of financial distress, which is costly (Mayers and Smith, 1987; 
and Bessembinder, 1991). Because hedging decisions increase the firm's debt 
capacity, they also raise the value of the firm through an increase in tax shields 
(Graham and Rogers, 2002). In addition, corporate risk hedging increases firm value 
by reducing underinvestment problems (Lessard, 1990). This occurs because hedging 
assures the firm's access to capital when there are positive net present value projects. 
Finally, hedging reduces a firm's expected tax liability when the tax schedule is 
convex (Mayers and Smith, 1982). 
B, Competitive Motive 
The goal of running a business is to win by defeating competitors. Porter (1979, 1980) 
develops a competitive forces model, in which companies take actions to keep their 
competitive advantages. However, only limited research has touched upon the 
influence that competition might have on management decisions. Present research 
holds that firms affect each other's strategic choices. White (2002) demonstrates that 
firms in the same industry are mutually influential. Land, Deane, and Blau (1991) 
show that a firm's conduct, at least in part, is result from the influence of nearby 
others within the same industry. The research of Fligstein (1985) has shown that 
firms are likely to copy the decisions of other firms in the same industry. Adam, 
Dasgupta and Titman (2004) discover that the incentives of a firm to hedge may 
actually decrease with the extent of hedging by competitors. Allayannis and Weston 
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(1999) find a positive link between the degree of competition in an industry and the 
extent of derivatives usage in that industry. Geczy, Minton and Schrand (1997) 
further demonstrate that "in industries with many firms there is more heterogeneity in 
hedging decisions than in industries with relatively few firms". 
There is an obvious difference between the studies of Allayannis and Weston (2001) 
and Guay and Kothari (2003), which may be the main cause of the differences in 
results. Allayannis and Weston automatically classify as derivative users those firms 
that report the use of foreign currency derivatives in the footnotes of their financial 
statement, while Guay and Kothari focus on the fraction of risk exposure hedged. 
Hull (20(35) and Nain (2005) provide stronger support that the volatility of cash flows 
and in turn the firm value of an individual hedged firm increases with the extent of 
hedging in the industry. They suggest that the reason is that there is a positive 
correlation between firms' hedging activities and the sensitivity of output prices to 
the foreign exchange rate shocks. Nain (2005) also shows that if a firm decides not to 
hedge its foreign exchange risk exposure, while hedging is widely used by its 
industry, that firm's value will be adversely affected. 
C, Hedging Versus Speculation 
Because of data unavailability, there are limited empirical tests of risk management 
theories. Earlier studies such as those by Nance et al. (1993) rely primarily on 
surveys. Firms have been required to disclose their derivatives use in footnotes only 
since the early 1990s. Thus, it is only since then that researchers can distinguish 
derivative users from nonusers. After that, more and more studies on derivatives use 
have emerged. Most studies such as Allayannis and Weston (2001) classify all 
derivative users as hedgers. Obviously, this method may exaggerate the total number 
of hedgers, since speculators are also included in the sample. 
Haushalter (2000) provides a more precise estimate of hedging by using the portion 
of the present year's production hedged with derivatives as a proxy for the dependent 
variable. Admittedly, this method may also be inaccurate, because the production 
exposed to exchange risk is not identical for different firms. For example, a domestic 
firm may not have any exports, and, consequently, this firm does not have any 
incentive to hedge exchange risk. On the other hand, a multinational firm may sell all 
its products in foreign markets, so hedging exchange rate movements is more 
meaningful lor it. 
On the other hand, Mian (1996) labels firms as hedgers if they report their hedging 
activities distinctly, which means hedging is a significant percentage of its sales. This 
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method should at least exclude some speculators from the sample. The underlying 
reason is that value maximization theory predicts an increase in firm value following 
hedging activities. Accordingly, firms are less likely to hide their hedging activities 
when they do hedge. The limitation of this method is that firms are closer to 
non-hedgers if they hedge only a very small portion of their risks. 
Following Mian (1996), in this paper hedgers are classified as those firms that clearly 
disclose their hedging activities. To better understand the relation between hedging 
and firm value, this research proposes to use the fraction of the current year's foreign 
sales that has been hedged with derivatives to capture the extent to which firms hedge 
their risk exposure, 
Following Nain (2005) and Allayannis and Weston (2001), this study will also 
estimate the influence of hedging foreign currency derivatives on firm market value, 
using a proxy for hedging which is explained in the following section. The purpose of 
this paper is to shed light on the question of whether a firm's value is affected by the 
hedging decisions of its competitors. 
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Chapter III. Assumptions and Hypotheses 
Most conventional theories indirectly relate hedging activities to higher firm value. 
However, empirical studies provide conflicting evidence of this link. Therefore, the 
first hypothesis of this study is that hedging activities lead to higher firm value. 
Suppose thai firms are competitors in their market and hedging activities lead to 
higher firm value. Further assume that companies observe the hedging choices of 
their competitors before deciding on their own hedging decision. If that is the case, 
then equilibrium demands each firm's hedging decision to be a best reaction to the 
hedging choices of its rivals. Also, in industries where derivatives use is common, 
firms may be better off to use derivatives for hedging purpose. 
This paper will test the following two hypotheses. 
Null Hypothesis It 
The degree of hedging in an industry has no effect on the benefits of hedging activity 
to a firm. 
In other words, then firm value of un-hedged companies, with significant foreign 
sales, will not be influenced by the degree of hedging within the industry. 
NMH Hypothesis 2: 
The decision of the firm to hedge does not depend on the hedging level within the 
industry. 
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Chapter IV Sample Selection 
The sample consists of firms that are part of on the S&P 1500 Composite Index with 
complete data throughout the time period from 2003 to 2005. For each firm-year 
observation, all other financial statement information needed for research models are 
obtained from the COMPUSTAT annual database. Data on institutional shareholdings 
and options holdings, the notional amount of derivative usage, and CEO ownership, 
are collected from proxy statements and annual reports. The firms in the final sample 
are firms with complete performance data available on COMPUSTAT. 
Finns without foreign sales are excluded because the goal of this research paper is to 
examine only those firms that are a firm which is exposed to foreign exchange risk 
and thus have a need for hedging. SFAS 133 requires firms to clearly indicate 
whether they use derivatives for hedging or trading purposes. The financial footnotes 
arm **>EC 10-K filings are checked for the following keywords using a text search: 
hedge, derivative, financial instrument, forward, futures, swap, option, notional value, 
and fair value. SEC 10-K statements are downloaded from the EDGAR database 
maintained by the SEC. If any of the keywords are found, the surrounding text is read 
thoroughly to confirm that it refers to foreign currency derivatives. A firm is 
identified as a foreign currency derivative user for that year if it discloses the use of 
derivatives for hedging purposes. For firms that are classified as foreign currency 
derivative users for hedging purposes, information on the year-end gross notional 
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outstanding amounts of foreign exchange derivatives is collected. Firms which do not 
disclose foreign currency derivative use for that year are classified as foreign 
currency derivative non-users for hedging purposes for that year. 
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Chapter V. Methodology 
A. Test for Hypothesis I 
The first investigation concerns the relationship between derivatives use and firm 
value. According to the findings of Aliayannis and Weston (2001), firm value (as 
measured by estimates of Tobin's Q) will be higher if U.S. firms use foreign 
exchange derivatives.'The following analysis uses a multivariate test to investigate 
the relationship between firm value and industry derivatives use. These results 
confirm the doubt on the notion that firms which hedge show higher firm value by 
estimating OLS regressions with Tobin's Q as the dependent variable. Consequently, 
the analysis also tries to verify, in addition to other factors that are known to 
influence firm value, whether the competitive use of derivatives in the same industry 
drives firms to change their hedging decisions. Therefore, the effect of foreign 
exchange hedging on firm value given the level of foreign sales of a firm and the 
industry hedging activity is examined by employing the following regression model. 
VALUE = f (FOREIGN, INDHEDGACT, DEGREE, (INDHEDGACT -
INDHEDGACT AVERAGE) * (DEGREE - DEGREE AVERAGE), (DEGREE -
DEGREE AVERAGE) * (FOREIGN - FOREIGN AVERAGE), SIZE, PROFIT, 
GROWTH, LEVERAGE, TIME) 
19 
a. Dependent Variable — Proxy for firm value (VALUE) 
Tofoirf s 0 - a measure of firm value 
Habib and Ljungqvist (2005) define the present value of the cash flows generated by 
the firm's assets as firm value, which can be estimated by Tobin's Q, as follows: 
Tobin's Q =: (market value of equity + assets - book value of equity) / Total Assets 
Market value of equity= Price * shares outstanding (CRSP) 
Thus. Q will be greater than 1 if corporate actions will benefit the firm producing 
value. The more value produced, the higher the Q. Tobin's Q will be less than 1 if 
corporate actions will harm the firm, thus reducing value. The more value is 
reduced, the lower the Q. 
b. Proportion of foreign sales (FOREIGN): 
Ailayannis and Ofek (2001) state that geographic diversification increases firm value. 
In line with their methodology, we calculate the fraction of foreign sales to total sales 
for each firm as a proxy for geographic diversification. We expect that this variable is 
positively related to firm value when the firm hedges more while its risk exposure is 
relatively high and hedges less while its risk exposure is relatively low. On the other 
hand, it would have a negative value when the firm hedges more while its risk 
exposure is low and hedges less while its risk exposure is high. 
20 
c. Degree of hedging by a firm (DEGREE) 
Following Allayannis and Ofek (2001), the fraction of notional value of foreign 
currency derivatives contracts to total assets is used to measure the degree of hedging 
by a firm, 
d. Hedging activity of an industry (INDHEDGACT) 
All firms with the same first-digit SIC code in the sample are classified as belonging 
to one Industry. For each industry, the fraction of hedging activity in an industry is 
calculated as the total number of firms in that industry disclosing foreign currency 
derivatives usage for hedging divided by the total number of firms exposed to foreign 
exchange risk in that industry. 
c. Interaction variable 
(INDHEDGACT-INDHEDGACI'AVERAGE)*'(DEGREE-DEGREE AVERAGE) 
This interaction variable is used to investigate the difference in firm value between 
un-hedged and hedged firms in industries, which is the focus of this project. It 
implies that, for a company which has a significant amount of foreign sales, the firm 
value increases more with hedging activities, if other firms in the corresponding 
industry are widely hedged using derivatives. On the other hand, the decision to 
remain un-hedged by a firm which has a significant amount of foreign sales, when 
many oiher companies in an industry are hedging is viewed as a negative signal about 
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management's ability to recognize and manage foreign exchange risk. Accordingly, 
un-hedged. firms in an industry where hedging is common may face lower firm value. 
We expect a positive effect on value if the firm hedges more than average when the 
industry hedges more than average and the firm hedges less than average when the 
industry hedges less than average. On the other hand, we expect a negative effect on 
if the firm hedges more than average when the industry hedges less than average or 
the firm hedges less than average when the industry hedges more than average. 
Bellowing Table 1 shows possible effects of the interaction between industry hedging 
and firm hedging on firm value. 
Insert Table 1 
/.' Control Variables 
When estimating the effect of industry hedging on firm value, factors that have been 
known to impact firm value are controlled for in the regression. The control variables 
are similar to those used in previous research and the reasons for using them are 
given below. 
Firm size (SIZE) 
There is some evidence for US firms that large size leads to higher profitability 
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(Mueller, 1987, and Peitzman, 1977). It is argued that large firms are more likely to 
use derivatives than small firms because of the costs involved in setting up a hedging 
program. Therefore, total assets and total sales are used to control for size effects. It is 
expected that size is positively related to Tobin's Q. 
Profitability (PROFIT): 
Allayarmis and Weston (2001) argue that a profitable firm is more likely to be valued 
higher than a less profitable one. If users of foreign currency derivatives are more 
profitable, they will have a higher value. To control for profitability, return on assets, 
defined as the ratio of net income to total assets will be used. It is expected that the 
profitability variable will be positively related to Tobin's Q. 
Investment Growth (GROWTH) 
Firm values are found to depend on future investment opportunities (Mayers, 1977, 
and Smith and Watts, 1992). Thus, the ratio of research and development 
expenditures to total sales is used as a proxy for investment growth (Yermack, 1996). 
It is expected that growth variables will be positively related to Tobin's Q. 
Leverage (LEVERAGE) 
According to Allayannis and Weston (2001), a firm's value can be affected by its 
capital structure. To control for differences in capital structure, we use a financial 
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leverage variable that is measured as the ratio of long term debt to shareholders' 
equity, it is expected that firms with more leverage will have a higher Tobin's Q. 
Time effects (TIME) 
Since firm observations are collected across multiple years, we use a yearly dummy 
to control for time varying effects. Time effects are controlled by using year 
dunun ies. 
B. Test for Hypothesis II 
it is noted by Main (2005) that there might be a positive relationship between a firm's 
probability of hedging and the level of hedging in an industry. A logit model is used 
to examine whether a firm's decision to hedge is affected by the hedging level of 
other firms in this industry, if a need to hedge arises. The dependent variable is a 
hedging dummy thai equals one if the firm discloses the use of foreign currency 
derivatives and zero otherwise. 
DUMH = f (INDHEDGACT, FOREIGN, FOREIGN * INDHEDGACT, TAX, 
SUBS, SIZE, UNINVST, DISTRESS, MANGINC, INFOASY) 
a. Decision to hedge (DUMH) 
DUMH is equal to one if a firm uses foreign currency derivatives for hedging 
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purposes and zero otherwise. 
b. Proportion of foreign sales (FOREIGN) 
The fraction of foreign sales to total sales is expected to be positively related to 
hedging decisions since hedging exchange rate risk is more important for firms with a 
large proportion of foreign sales to total sales. This would have a positive effect on 
risk management decision to hedge while its risk exposure is relatively high. It would 
have a negative effect on risk management decision to hedge while its risk exposure 
is low. 
c. Hedging activity in an industry (INDHEDGACT) 
If hedging is common in an industry, firms are more like to hedge (Fligstein, 1985). 
AH firms with the same first-digit SIC code in the sample are classified as belonging 
to one industry. For each industry, INDHEDGACT presents the fraction of hedging 
activity in an industry, which is calculated as the total number of firms in that 
industry disclosing foreign currency derivatives usage for hedging divided by the 
total number of firms exposed to foreign exchange risk in that industry. 
d. Interaction variable (FOREIGN * INDHEDGACT) 
This interaction variable is used to investigate the difference in firm hedge decision 
motive in industries, which is the second focus of this project. It implies that, for a 
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company which has a significant amount of foreign sales, the firm has a stronger 
motive to hedge, if other firms in the corresponding industry are widely hedged using 
derivatives as well. On the other hand, the motive to remain un-hedged by a firm will 
increase if a firm has an insignificant amount of foreign sales and operates in an 
industry in which hedging is uncommon. 
Accordingly, our interaction of Foreign with 1NDHEDGACT is expected to be 
positively related to DUMH, because a firm's incentive to hedge increases with the 
number of other hedged firms in the industry, if a need to hedge arises. 
e. Control Variables 
Much of the literature argues that some firm specific characteristics might affect firm 
value. Kim and Lyn (1986), Morck and Yeung (1991), Bodnar, Tang and Weintrop, 
(1999) and Denis, Denis and Yost (2002) provide empirical support for research and 
development (R&D) and advertising expenditures as proxies for firm-specific 
(intangible) assets. Capital structure (debt) is also used to control for the valuation 
effects that may result from financial leverage. In the industrial diversification 
literature, Lang and Stulz (1994), Berger and Ofek (1995), and Servaes (1996) show 
ihe importance of controlling for firm size. Other factors such as growth 
opportunities (investment) and profitability are also included as additional corporate 
control variables. Table 2 provides an overview of our summary of control variables, 
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how they are estimated and their expected relationship with firm value. 
Insert Table 2 
27 
Chapter VI. Empirical Results 
A, Univariate Tests 
The sample is constructed from firms that are part of the Standard & Poor's list of the 
S&P 1500 Composite Index (SPSUPX) which represents the top 1,500 stocks and 
mutual funds in the market. The S&P 1500 is comprised of stocks in the S&P 500 
Large-Cap, S&P 400 Mid Cap Index, and S&P 600 Small Cap Index. Some of the 
companies in the initial sample are dropped owing to inability to locate the proxy 
statements or yearly reports for the fiscal years covered. Several observations also are 
deleted because of missing data in COMPUSTAT annual files. Therefore, the final 
complete data sample consists of 152 large cap firms, 96 mid caps and 135 small caps 
firms, giving us a total of 383 companies. Our empirical analysis covers a time period 
of 3 years, from 2003 to 2005. 
This paper utilizes hand collected data relating to whether firms are hedging and the 
notional amount of derivatives used. The paper first describes the dispersion of 
hedging activities within these firms. These statistics of financial derivatives usage of 
firms of different sizes are presented in Table 3. The numbers of observations, mean, 
standard deviation and median values of the notional amount of derivatives are 
reported. All data are from 10-K disclosures and are measured in millions of dollar. 
28 
Panel A provides descriptive statistics for our sample of 152 large caps firms in the 
S&P 500 Large Cap Index. A firm is defined as a foreign exchange hedger if it 
provides a qualitative disclosure of any foreign currency hedging activity in its 
annual report. Panel B presents descriptive statistics on 96 median caps firms in the 
S&P 400 Mid Cap Index. Panel C presents descriptive statistics on 135 small 
capsfirnis in the S&P 600 Small Cap Index. 
Insert Table 3 
Tabic 3 shows that there is a wide dispersion of derivative usage among hedging 
firms. On average, approximately 80% of the 152 firms listed in the S&P 500 Large 
Cap Index report the use of financial derivatives. Among the 96 firms listed in the 
S&P 400 Mid Cap Index, 40% of firms use foreign currency derivatives. Foreign 
currency derivatives are the least popular among firms in S&P 600 Small Cap Index 
(32% of 144). The standard deviation for the extent of hedging is $ 3000 million for 
iarge cap, $140 million for median cap and $45 million for small cap firms. 
Given that in Table 3, as the percentage of hedgers in the sample of large cap firms 
(80%) is higher than that of mid (40%) and small cap firms (30%), it appears that 
large firms are more likely to hedge than medium and small size firms in response to 
foreign, exchange risks. This phenomenon can be explained by the resource 
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constraints and financing problems of small firms. Recall that risk management 
requires hiring well-trained specialists and employing a large amount of extra funds, 
which make it an expensive activity that small firms may not be able to afford. The 
costs of these risk management activities can explain why larger firms hedge more. 
Also, larger firms usually have a greater proportion of foreign currency exposure and 
more funds to use, which provides another incentive for them to pay attention to risk 
management. Interestingly, despite their large size, for the large cap firms, compared 
to medium and small size firms, the speed of the increase of the percentage of firms 
which hedge in each year seems to be significantly lower in 3 year study periods. 
This fact suggests that an important risk management program is not exclusive to 
large firms nowadays. 
The evidence suggests that small firms may belong to a strategic group that is distinct 
from that of their larger counterparts, and makes them face less competition. 
Small-firm profits are self-determining of other firm profits. Accordingly, large and 
small firms may repose different in same segments of the market instead of 
competing directly. Most importantly, this result suggests that larger firms are more 
iikeiy to hedge and derivative users tend to be in more competitive economies. 
Consider the differences in the underlying characteristics among these US companies. 
Much of the literature argues that some firm specific characteristics might affect firm 
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value. 'Fable 4 provides some the descriptive statistics for our firm characteristic 
variables. The table reports the descriptive statistics of firm characteristics over the 
period 2003-2005. All variables are in dollar millions and defined in Table 2. All data 
are from 10-K disclosures. Means, medians, and standard deviations are reported. 
Panel A provides firm characteristic data for the 152 large caps firms from the S&P 
500 Large Cap Index. Panel B presents firm characteristics data for our 96 median 
caps firms in the S&P 400 Mid Cap Index. Panel C presents firm characteristics data 
for the i 35 small cap firms in the S&P 600 Small Cap Index. 
Insert Table 4 
As noted above, our study breaks the sample into three groups according to firm sizes. 
Table 4 reports the descriptive statistics for the underlying characteristics used in the 
regression analysis for three sets of firms (large, median and small cap). The results 
demonstrate that firms with larger sizes have higher financial distress costs measured 
by leverage, have lower institutional shareholding and less managerial shareholding 
and options holdings. As a matter of fact, larger firms have higher tendency to suffer 
from the information asymmetry problem caused by the conflict of interests between 
managers and shareholders, because their activities are more complex to monitor. 
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'I"he results reported in Table 3 and Table 4 further suggest that firms which are larger 
m terrns of market value and sales revenues, derivatives for hedging more extensively. 
In addition, our results imply that the firms in the three groups present different 
characteristics. Firms use more derivatives in industries where fewer risk 
management substitutes exist. Moreover, higher financial distress leads to a stronger 
incentive to involve in hedge program. Our results consist with the previous literature 
that the risk management level adopted by a firm seems to be related to the costs of 
financial distress, contracting costs, the costs of raising external capital, taxes, and 
underinvestment problems. 
B. Multivariate Tests 
Test for Method I 
As in Tufano (1996), our study investigates the determinants of the risk management 
decision for a dataset of 383 firms included in the S&P 1500 Composite Index. This 
research employs annual data from a more recent three year period from 2003 to 
2005, These data allow for a greater number of observations and produce results that 
suffer less from problems related to small sample size. In addition, the large size of 
our sample makes it easier to capture the dynamic aspect a firm's the risk 
management decision. Finally, we employ a logit model in order to verify the 
theoretical arguments presented in the literature. 
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The first investigation concerns the relationship between derivatives use and firm 
value. An ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model is used to testify the 
relationship between firm value and industry derivatives use to account for the 
censoring of the dependent variable. The following analysis employs a multivariate 
test with Tobin's Q as a dependent variable. These results reject our hypothesis that 
linns with extensive hedging are valued higher. 
VALUE = f (FOREIGN, INDHEDGACT, DEGREE, (INDHEDGACT -
INDHEDGACT AVERAGE) * (DEGREE-DEGREE AVERAGE), 
(DEGREE-DEGREE AVERAGE) * (FOREIGN-FOREIGN AVERAGE), SIZE, 
PROFIT, GROWTH, LEVERAGE, TIME) 
Table 5 reports an OLS regression with FX derivative use and firm value for large 
cap firms. The table displays the regression results for a sample of 152 large cap 
firms in the S&P 500 Large Cap Index. The dependent variable is Tobin's Q, which is 
calculated as the market value of total assets. INDHEDGACT presents the number of 
firms in an industry that use hedging divided by the total number of firms in that 
industry. P-values shown in boldface indicate that the corresponding coefficients of 
the regression are statistically significant at the 90% confidence level. 
Insert Table 5 
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Fable 6 provided the results for an OLS regression with FX derivative use and firm 
value for median cap firms. The table displays the regressions results for a sample of 
96 median cap firms in the S&P 400 Mid Cap Index. 
Insert Table 6 
Table 7 provided the results for an OLS regression with FX derivative use and firm 
value for small cap firms. The table displays the results for a sample of 135 small cap 
firms in the S&P 600 Small Cap Index. 
Insert Table 7 
In table 5, 6 and 7, the coefficients on foreign sales and the industry derivatives usage 
level are not significant. Also, coefficients of the interaction of the industry derivative 
usage level relative to its average (DEGREE-AVERAGE) and the firm's hedging 
degree relative to its average (INDHEDGACT -AVERAGE) for all firm sizes have 
the anticipated sign they are not statistically significant. The null hypothesis of no 
correlation is accepted, which is that hedged and un-hedged firms are valued the 
same in spite of the level of hedging in the industry. It indicates that a firm's 
involvement in hedging activities does not depend on the competitive pressure within 
its industry. It is in line with some systematic theories that risk management is 
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irrelevant to firm value. 
lest for Method II 
A iogit model is used to examine whether a firm's decision to hedge is affected by the 
hedging level of other firms in this industry, if a need to hedge arises. The dependent 
variable is a hedging dummy that equals one if the firm discloses the use of foreign 
currency derivatives and zero otherwise. 
DUMB = f (INDHEDGACT, FOREIGN, FOREIGN * FNDHEDGACT, TAX, 
SUBS, SIZE, UNINVST, DISTRESS, MANGFNC, INFOASY) 
Table 8, 9 and 10 show the logit regression estimates of how the extent of hedging in 
an industry affects a firm's decision to hedge. The extent of hedging in an industry is 
measured as the number of hedgers divided by the total number of firms in the 
industry. P-values shown in boldface indicate that the corresponding coefficients of 
the regression are statistically significant at the 90% confidence level. 
Insert Table 8 
Insert Table 9 
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Insert Table 10 
According to the results of the logit model with all variables in Table 8, Table 9 and 
Table 10, most variables have the predicted coefficient as in Table 2 and are 
significant in explaining the probability that a firm will hedge. However, the 
coefficients of YEAR are not significant, possibly because "hedging with derivatives is a 
relatively new trend for risk management; whether the firm will hedge is not related to 
how seasoned the firm has been, but how willing the firm is in catching up new 
techniques". The coefficient on the interactive variable FOREIGN* INDHEDGACT 
is significant. The results reject the null hypothesis that a firm is likely to hedge when 
the extent of hedging in the industry is high. These results provide some evidence that 
a firm's hedging is influenced by hedging within its industry. A 1% increase in the 
extent of hedging in the industry results in a 253% increase in the probability of 
hedging for large cap firms. A 1% increase in the extent of hedging in the industry 
results in a 5.38% increase in the probability of hedging for mid caps. A 1% increase 
In the extent of hedging in the industry results in a 16.25%o increase in the probability 
of hedging for small cap firms. Thus, large cap firms have a greater incentive to 
hedge and the effect of industry hedging is large compared to the effect of 
firm-specific control variables in the regressions. 
Overaii, as Table 8, Table 9 and Table 10 report, even when the endogenous relation 
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is controlled between the need for hedging and the competitive motive for risk 
management, firms will follow the industry "norm". The evidence also suggests that 
larger firms hedge more. Firms seem to hedge more when a sufficient number of their 
competitors actually take actions to hedge. This result also suggests that when there is 
an insufficient number of firms that use risk management, managers will be tempted 
not to hedge. The results also demonstrate that hedging is an increasing function of 
the level of hedging in the industry. The results reported confirm that firms manage 
risk because of the competitive motive, and are more willing to do so when they are 
large. This finding can be explained by the high costs of risk management. Recall that 
hedging activities such as hiring financial specialists and implement financial 
instruments are generally very costly and small firms might not be able to afford 
them. 
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Chapter VII. Conclusion 
The study starts by constructing interactive variables that capture these effects. Using a 
proxy for the industry level of foreign exchange hedging activity, this research tests the 
effect of competition on foreign exchange risk management. This research extends Nain's 
(2004) work by taking into consideration both the hedging needs of a firm and the degree 
of hedging by a firm into consideration. However, the analysis suggests that even if a 
firm is un-hedged in a highly hedged industry, there will not be a significant negative 
effect on firm value. Therefore, the study contributes to the literature by demonstrating 
there is no impact of market competition on firm value, given the level of foreign 
sales of the firm and the level of industry hedging. 
An important focus of firms' hedging strategies is to consider their competitors' actions. 
Adopting a foreign exchange hedging strategy that differs from "the norm" will expose 
firms to the increased competition risk from opponents. If a majority of firms in the same 
industry are "in the same boat," it will be easier for managers to handle the unexpected 
changes caused by the foreign exchange exposure. This thesis empirically tests the effect 
of competition and the level of hedging within its industry on the decision of a firm to 
hedge for a sample of US firms in S&P 1500. The study also adds empirical evidence 
that the hedging decisions of its rivals contribute to a firm's decision to hedge, if the 
necessity for hedging arises. Specifically, the incentive of an individual firm to hedge 
increases as its main competitors hedge, and the incentive decreases as its 
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competitors choose not to hedge. In other words, individual firms' derivatives usage 
depends on the level of hedging by other firms in their industries. 
In particular, this research divides the sample into three sets according to firm size 
(large, median and small cap) and runs regressions separately. Firm size is shown to 
play an active role in the foreign exchange risk management decision and the results 
confirm that larger firms are more likely to hedge. The underlying reason might be 
that companies tend to manage exchange rate fluctuations to remain competitive. 
Larger firms are more able to manage margins successfully and smooth out the large 
swings of revenues and costs. In addition, foreign currency risk management is a costly 
activity that smaller firms might not be able to afford. 
Another important implication of the empirical evidence of this paper is to capture the 
hedging activity of firms in various industries that are part of the listed in Standard & 
Poor's '500 Composite Index. Industries differ in form and level of competition. Firms in 
highly competitive industries behave quite differently from firms in industries with low 
competition since competition is a key factor in determining how firms manage risk. 
However, different levels of competition may lead to different levels of hedging, thus 
having no effect on the outcomes for firm values. This paper seeks to measure the 
impact of industry hedging levels on firm value and provides insight into some aspect 
of risk management for managers. It is vital for managers to make decisions based 
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not only on the company's own conditions and needs, but also to pay close attention 
to the effect of the level of hedging by other competitors in the same industry. 
Therefore, based on the above conclusions, some suggestions for foreign currency 
risk management are provided as follows: 
A. Suggestions on hedging strategies for corporations 
• Identify the FX risk level and evaluate the potential need for hedging 
Foreign exchange risk exposure may cause tremendous earnings volatility and affect a 
firm's cash position, which increases the need for foreign currency risk management. It is 
vital to identify and quantify the foreign sales portion of the company so that there are 
realistic expectations of the need for hedge products. 
• Research and assess the hedging activities of the company's competitors 
An important focus of firms' hedging strategies is to observe their competitors' risk 
management activities. If a majority of firms in the same industry are "in the same boat," it 
will be easier for managers to reduce the possibility of adverse price movements caused by 
the foreign exchange exposure. 
a Map the state of hedging activity in the whole industry 
In some industries, more and more firms in the industry have realized the importance of 
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managing risk and are currently working to develop hedging programs. In some industries, 
no one hedges, thus there is no competitive advantage and everyone suffers together. 
Hence, managers need to obtain a clear idea of hedging within the industry. 
n Develop risk management action plans 
Managers should make sure that the risk management products and strategies are 
necessarily supported, properly executed, and regularly evaluated by senior management. 
Li Adjust hedge decisions accordingly 
A risk management plan must be designed according to each organization' s particular 
goals, and market needs. The hedge decision should also be customized to each firm's risk 
tolerance. 
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B. Limitations and Future Research Avenues 
The research is limited to consider that derivative holdings may measure, not only hedging 
activities, but also speculation. SFAS 133 requires firms to explicitly state whether they 
speculate with derivatives. However, speculative firms may present themselves as hedgers 
on purpose, since hedging activities are widely recognized as a value-increasing strategy. 
In addition, this study simply uses firms' derivatives choices as a proxy for hedging 
choices. However, firms can hedge cash flows in many different ways, including other 
financial and operating strategies. This research could be extended by taking into 
consideration other methods that firms could use to hedge foreign exchange risk. 
42 
References 
Adam, T., Dasgupta, S, and Titman, S., 2004, Financial Constraints, Competition, 
and Hedging in Industry Equilibrium, Hong Kong University of Science and 
Technology, Working Paper 
Adam, T., and Chitra S. Fernando, 2003, Are There Speculative Components in 
Corporate Hedging and Do They Add Value? Hong Kong University of Science and 
Technology, Working Paper 
Alkeback, P., and Hagelin N., 1999, Derivative Usage by Nonfinancial Firms in 
Sweden with an International Comparison., Journal of International Financial 
Management and Accounting 10:2, 105-121 
Allayannis, G., and Ofek E., 2001, Exchange Rate Exposure, Hedging, and the Use 
of Foreign Currency Derivatives, Journal of International Money and Finance 20, 
273-296 
Allayannis, G., and Weston J.P., 2001, The Use of Foreign Currency Derivatives and 
Firm Market Value, Review of Financial Studies 14:1, 243-276. 
Allaz, B. and Vila J.-L., 1993, Cournot Competition, Forward Markets and Efficiency, 
Journal of Economic Theory 59:1, 16 
Aretz K., Bartram S. and Dufey G, 2007, Why hedge? Rationales for Corporate 
Hedging and Value Implications, Lancaster University Management School, 
Working Paper 
Berger, P.G., E. Ofek, and Swary I., 1996, Investor Valuation of the Abandonment 
Option, Journal of Financial Economics, 42, 257-287. 
Bessembinder, H., 1991. Forward Contracts and Firm Value: Investment Incentive 
and Contracting Effects, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 26, 519-532. 
Bodnar G., Charles T., and Joseph W., 1999, Both Sides of Corporate Diversification: 
The Value Impacts of Geographic and Industrial Diversification, National Bureau of 
Economic Research, Working Paper 
Bodnar G, Abe de J. and, Victor M., 2003, The Impact of Institutional Differences on 
Derivatives Usage: A Comparative Study of US and Dutch Firms, European Financial 
Management, 9, 271-297 
43 
Braga S., Marcelo E., Vihang R. and Miller, Darius P., 2003, Does Corporate International 
Diversification Destroy Value? Evidence from Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions, 
(unpublished), Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=502322 
Brown, G. 2001, Managing Foreign Exchange Risk with Derivatives, Journal of 
Financial Economics, 60:2/3: 401-491 
Denis, D.J., Denis D.K. and Sarin A., 2002, Managerial Incentives and Corporate 
Diversification Strategies, Bank of America Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 10:2, 
72-80, 
Fligstein, N., 1985. The Spread of the Multidivisional Form, American Sociological 
Review, 50, 377-391 
Geczy, C , Minton, B., and Schrand, C , 1999, Choices among Alternative Risk 
Management Strategies: Evidence from the Natural Gas Industry, University of 
Pennsylvania, Working Paper 
Graham, J.R., and D.A. Rogers, 2002, Do Firms Hedge In Response to Tax Incentives? 
Journal of Finance 57:2, 815-840. 
Graham John R, 1996, Debt and the Marginal Tax Rate, The Journal of Financial 
Economics, 41, 41-74 
Guay, W. and S. P. Kothari, 2003, How Much Do Firms Hedge with Derivatives, 
Journal of Financial Economics, 70, 423-461 
Gowri A, Mingjun T. and Zhen W., 2006, Firm Value and Hedging Level of Industry, 
Seminar in Financial Theory and Corporate Policy, Concordia University, Research 
Proposal 
Haushalter, G.D. 2000, Financing Policy, Basis Risk, and Corporate Hedging: 
Evidence from Oil and Gas Producers, Journal of Finance 55:1, 107-152 
Hull, J., 2005, Options, Futures and Other Derivatives (6th Edition), Prentice Hall 
College 
John D. and Luc S., 1993, Three Agency-Cost Reasons for Hedging Foreign Exchange 
Risk, Barmarick Publications, 19: 6 , 35 - 44 
44 
Land, K.., Deane, G., and Blau, J., 1991, Religious Pluralism and Church Membership: 
A Spatial Diffusion Model. American Sociological Review, 56, 237-249. 
Lang, L.H.P. and Stulz, R., 1992, Effects of Bankruptcy Announcements on 
Competitors, Journal of Financial Economics, 32, 45-60. 
Lessard, D.R., 1991, Global Competition and Corporate Finance in the 1990s, Journal 
of Applied Corporate Finance, 3: 4, 59-72 
Mayers, D., and Smith C.W., 982, On the Corporate Demand for Insurance, Journal of 
Business, 55:2, 281-296. 
Mayers, D., and Smith, Jr. C.W., 1987, Corporate Insurance and the Underinvestment 
Problem, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 54:1, 45-54. 
Mian, S.L, 1996, Evidence on Corporate Hedging Policy, Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis, 31:3, 419-439. 
Michel A. Habib and Alexander Ljungqvist, 2005, Firm Value and Managerial 
Incentives: A Stochastic Frontier Approach, Journal of Business, University of 
Chicago Press, 78: 6, 2053-2094 
Modigliani and Mueller D., 1987, The Corporation: Growth, Diversification and 
Mergers, New York: Harwood Academic Publishers. 
Morck, R, and Yeung B., 1991, Why Investors Value Multinationality, Journal of 
Business, 64: 165-187 
Nain, A., 2005, Strategic Motives for Corporate Risk Management, University of 
Michigan, Working Paper 
Nance D., Smith C. and Smithson C, 1993, On the Determinants of Corporate 
Hedging, The Journal of Finance, 48, 267-284 
Porter, M. E., 1979, The Structure within Industries and Companies' Performance, 
Review of Economics and Statistics, 61:2, 214-27 
Porter, M. E., 1980, Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries and 
Competitors, New York, NY: Free Press, Copies are available at the Main and Seamus 
Heaney Libraries 
45 
Servaes, H., 1996, The Value of Diversification During the Conglomerate Merger 
Wave, Journal of Finance, 51: 1201-1225 
Smith, C. and Watts R., 1992, The Investment Opportunity Set and Corporate 
Financing, Dividend, and Compensation Policies, Journal of Financial Economics, 32, 
263-292. 
Smith, C.W., and Stulz R.M., 1985, The Determinants of Firms' Hedging Policies, 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 20:4, 391-405. 
Tufano Peter; 1996, Who manages risk? An Empirical Examination of Risk 
Management Practices in the Gold Mining Industry, The Journal of Finance, 51:4, 
1097 
Yermack, D., 1996, Higher Market Valuation of Companies with a Small Board of 
Directors, Journal of Financial Economics, 40, 185-211 
46 
Other Relevant Papers 
Allayannis, G., Aretz K. and Bartram S.M., 2002, Corporate Hedging - Lessons 
Learned and Issues to be Explored, Darden School, Working Paper 
Allayannis, Y,, Brown G. and Klapper L., 2003, Capital Structure and Financial Risk: 
Evidence from East Asia, Journal of Finance, forthcoming 
Allayannis G., Jane I., and James P. W., 2001, Exchange-rate Hedging: Financial vs. 
Operational Strategies, American Economic Review Papers & Proceedings, 91:2, 
391-395 
Allayannis G. and Ihrig J., 2001, Exposure and Markups, Review of Financial Studies, 
forth corning 
Arnrita, N., 2005, The Strategic Motives for Corporate Risk Management, 
Department of Finance, University of Michigan, Working paper. 
Arnrita, N., 2005, Corporate Risk Management in an Industry Setting: An Empirical 
Investigation, Working Paper 
Arnrit Judge, 2004, The Determinants of Foreign Currency Hedging by UK 
Non-Financial Firms, Middlesex University, Working Paper 
Antoine, G., 2006, Optimal Use of Futures Contracts for the Competitive Firm, 
Applied Financial Economics, 16: 5, 425. 
Anand K., 1999, Firm Specific Factors and the Exchange Rate Exposure of 
Multinational Corporations, Florida Atlantic University, Doctor Dissertation 
Armstrong, J., 1994, Competitor-oriented Objectives: The Myth of Market Share, 
Working Paper 
Ardeshir J. Dalai and Moawia A., 2005, Competitive Firm Behavior with 
Simultaneous Price and Output Uncertainty, University of St. Andrews, Working 
t aper 
Austin Murphy, 2006, Hedging Business Currency Risk, Working Paper 
Aziz, L., 2004, Does Hedging Increase Firm Value? Evidence from Oil and Gas 
Producing firms, Working Paper 
47 
Bartram, S.M., 2000, Corporate Risk Management as a Lever for Shareholder Value 
Creation, Financial Markets, Institutions, and Instruments, 9:5: 279-324 
Bartram, S.M., 2002, Enhancing Shareholder Value with Corporate Risk Management, 
Corporate Finance Review, 7:3: 7-12. 
Berger, P.O., and E. Ofek, 1995, Diversification's Effect on Firm Value, Journal of 
Financial Economics, 37:1: 39-65 
Berkman, H., Bradbury M.E., and Magan S., 1997, An International Comparison of 
Derivatives Use, Financial Management, 26:4: 69-73 
Bartram, M. Sohnke, Gregory W. Brown and Frank R. Fehle, 2004, International 
Evidence on Financial Derivatives Usage, University of North Carolina, Working 
paper, 
Berkman, H. and Bradbury M., 1996, Empirical Evidence on the Corporate Use of 
Derivatives, Financial Management, 25, 5-13 
Bhagwan C. and Jonathan H,, 1995, Corporate Risk Management for Multinational 
Corporations: Financial and Operational Hedging Policies, UCLA, Working Paper 
Block, S. and, Timothy G, 1986, The Use of Interest Rate Futures and Options by 
Corporate Financial Managers, Financial Management, 15:.3, 73-78 
Borokhovich K. A., Brunarski K. R; Crutchley C. E and Simkins, B. J, 2001, Borad 
Composition and Corporate Investment in Interest rate, Derivatives, Working Paper 
Bodnar, G. and Gebhardt G., 1999, Derivatives Usage in Risk Management by US and 
German Non-financial Firms: A Comparative Survey, Journal of International 
Financial Management and Accounting, 10:3: 153-188. 
Bodnar, G., Tang C. and Weintrop J., 1997, Both Sides of Corporate Diversification: 
The Value Impact of Geographical and Industrial Diversification, NBER, Working 
Paper. 
Bodnar, G.M., Hayt G.S. and Marston R.C., 1998, 1998 Wharton Survey of Financial 
Risk Management by US Non-Financial Firms, Financial Management, 27:4: 70-91. 
48 
Bodnar, Gordon M., Gregory S. Hayt, and Richard C. Marston, 1996, 1995 Wharton 
Survey of Derivatives Usage by U.S. Non-financial Firms, Financial Management, 25, 
113-133 
Borokhovich K., Kelly B., Claire C. and, Betty S., 2004, Board Composition and 
Corporate Use of Interest Rate Derivatives, The Journal of Financial Research, 27: 2, 
199-216 
Brady S., 1994, A Hedge too Late, Corporate Finance, London: 110, 20-25 
Breeden, D., and Viswanathan S., 1996, Why Do Firms Hedge? An Asymmetric 
Information Model, Duke University, Working Paper 
Brail U., Schweimayer G., and Welzel P., 2003, Managing Credit Risk with Credit and 
Macro Derivatives, University of Augsburg, Discussion Paper, 252, 
Brookes A., Hargreaves D., Lucas C .and White BD, 2000, Can Hedging Insulate 
Firms from Exchange Rate Risk? Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bulletin, 63:1, 21-34 
Brown G., Peter C. and David H., 2003, Are Firms Successful at Selective Hedging? 
The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and Northwest Nazarene University, 
Working Paper 
Campbell T.S., and Kracaw W.A., 1987, Optimal Managerial Contracts and the Value 
of Corporate Insurance, Journal of Financial Quantitative Analysis, 22:3, 315-328 
Caillaud B., Georges D. and Bruno J., 2000, Corporate Insurance with Optimal 
Financial Contracting, Economic Theory, 16:1, 77-105 
Carpenter J., 2000, Does Option Compensation Increase Managerial Risk Appetite? 
The Journal of Finance, 55: 5, 2311-2331 
Carter, D. A., Rogers D. A., and Simkins B. J., 2003, Does Fuel Hedging Make 
Economic Sense? The Case of the US Airline Industry, Working Paper 
Carter D. A., Christos P., and Betty J. S., 2001, Firmwide Risk Management of Foreign 
Exchange Exposure by U.S. Multinational Corporations, Oklahoma State University, 
Working Paper, 
Carpenter J. N, 2000, Does Option Compensation Increase Managerial Risk Appetite? 
The Journal of Finance, 55:5; 2311 
49 
Chevalier, J. and Scharfstein D., 1995, Liquidity Constraints and the Cyclical Behavior 
of Markups, American Economic Review, 390-396 
Christoph A., 2006, Spatial Agglomeration, Competition and Firm Size, Mimeo, 
University of Dortmund, Working Paper 
Chowdhry B, and Jonathan T.B. Howe, 1999, Corporate Risk Management for 
Muitinational Corporations: Financial and Operational Hedging Policies, European 
Finance Review, 2, 229-246 
Chung, K. and Pruitt S., 1994, A Simple Approximation of Tobin's Q, Financial 
Management, 23, 70-74 
Christine M C, Beverly J H., 2001, The Challenges of Risk Management in 
Diversified Financial Companies. Economic Policy Review - Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York, New York: 7: 1, 1-17 
Cole E., Joan F. A., Kathleen E. and Sally L., Industry Analysis: The Five Forces, 
Purdue Extension, EC-722 
Collins, R.A., 1985, Expected Utility, Debt-Equity Structure, and Risk Balancing, 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 67: 627-629 
Collins, R.A., 1997, Toward a Positive Economic Theory of Hedging, American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics, 79: 488-499 
Coase, R., 1937, The Nature of Firms, Economica, 4, 386-405 
Core, J.E., Quay W.R., and Kothari S.P., 2002, The Economic Dilution of Employee 
Stock Options: Diluted EPS for Valuation and Financial Reporting, Accounting 
Review, 77:3, 627-653 
Core J. and Guay W., 2002, Estimating the Value of Employee Stock Option Portfolios 
and Their Sensitivities to Price and Volatility; Journal of Accounting Research, 40: 3, 
613 
Craig II., 2006, Getting an Edge on the Competition, Logging & Sawmilling Journal, 
31-33 
Cross J., 2000, Gold Derivatives: The Market View; The World Gold Council 
Publications 
50 
Dalvi M. and Vincent G. M., 1999, Liquidity Risk for Firms and Financial Markets, 
Derivative Quarterly, 49-55 
Dechovv P., K., Watts S. R., 1998, The Relation between Earnings and Cash Flows, 
Journal of Accounting & Economics, 25, 133-168 
DeMarzo P. and Duffie D., 1991, Corporate Financial Hedging with Proprietary 
Information, Journal of Economic Theory, 53, 261-286 
DeMarzo P. M., and Darrell D., 1995, Corporate Incentives for Hedging and Hedge 
Accounting, Review of Financial Studies, 8, 743-771 
DeMeza D., 1986, Safety in Conformity but Profits in Deviance, Canadian Journal of 
Economics, 19,261-269 
DeAngelo, H., and Masulis R.W., 1980, Optimal Capital Structure Under Corporate 
and Personal Taxation." Journal of Financial Economics, 8:1: 3-29 
DeCeuster M.J.K., Durinck E., Laveren E. and Lodewyckx J., 2000, A Survey into the 
Use of Derivatives by Large Non-financial Firms Operating in Belgium, European 
Financial Management, 6:3: 301-318 
Dionne G., and Thouraya T, 2005, On Risk Management Determinants: What Does 
Really Work? Mimeo, Risk Management Chair, HEC Montreal 
Dionne G. and Garand M., 2003, Risk Management Determinants Affecting Firms' 
Values in the Gold Mining Industry: New Empirical Evidence; Economics Letters, 
79:1, 43 
Dionne, G, and Thouraya T, 2005, Risk Management and Corporate Governance: The 
Importance of Independence and Financial Knowledge for the Board and the Audit 
Committee, HEC Montreal, Canada. 
Dionne, G., Robert G, Francois G. and Charles V, 1997, Debt, Moral Hazard and 
Airline Safety: an Empirical Evidence, Journal of Econometrics, 79, 379-402 
Douglas J., Nile W. H., 2000, Using Strategic Commitment to Influence Competitor 
Response, Working Paper 
Doherty N., 2000, Creating Value through Managing Corporate Risk: Insurance, 
Financial Products and Financial Strategies, Assurances, 68, 3, 309-332 
51 
Dolde W., 1995, Hedging, Leverage, and Primitive Risk, Journal of Financial 
Engineering, 4, 187-216 
Don A., 2000, Why Corporations Should Hedge, ASX Perspective, 4th quarter, 29-32 
Downie D., McMillan J. and Nosal E., 1996, The University of Waterloo Survey of 
Canadian Derivatives Use and Hedging Activities, In Managing Financial Risk, 
Yearbook 1996,C.W. Smithson, ed. CIBC-Wood Grundy: New York, 214-233 
Dunning, J., 1973, The Determinants of International Product, Oxford Economic 
Papers, 25, 289-336 
Elliott, W.B, Huffman S.P., and Makar S.D., 2003, Foreign Denominated Debt and 
Foreign Currency Derivatives: Complements or Substitutes in Hedging Foreign 
Currency Risk, Journal of Multinational Financial Management, 13: 2,123-139 
Fehle, F.R., 1999, Panel Evidence on Corporate Risk Management, Canadian Journal 
of Administrative Sciences, 16, 229-242 
Fehle, F.R., and Tsyplakov S., 2002, Dynamic Risk Management: Theory and 
Evidence, Working Paper 
Fok R. C.W., Carolyn C. and Ming C. C , 1997, Determinants of Corporate Hedging 
and Derivatives: A Revisit, Journal of Economics and Business, 49, 569-585 
Francis, J. and Stephan J., 1993, Characteristics of Hedging Firms: An Empirical 
Investigation, in Robert J. Schwartz and Clifford W. Smith, Jr., eds., Advanced 
Strategies in Financial Risk Management, New York Institute of Finance, 615- 635. 
Froot K.A., Scharfstein D.S., and Stein J.C., 1993, Risk Management: Coordinating 
Corporate Investment and Financing Policies, Journal of Finance, 48:5, 1629-1658 
Froot K.A., D.S. Scharfstein, and J.C. Stein 1994, A Framework for Risk Management, 
Harvard Business Review 72:6: 91-102. 
Gay G. D. and Nam J, 1999, The Underinvestment Problem and Corporate Derivatives 
Use, Financial Management; 27:4, 53 
Geczy, C , Minton B.A., and Schrand C, 1997, Why Firms Use Currency Derivatives, 
Journal of Finance 52:4, 1323-1354 
52 
Graham, J., Rogers, D., 2000, Is Corporate Hedging Consistent with Value 
Maximization? An Empirical Analysis, Duke University, Working Paper 
Graham J. R; 1996, Proxies for the Corporate Marginal Tax Rate, The Journal of 
Financial Economics, 42, 187 
Graham J. R and Smith C. W, 1999, Tax Incentives to Hedge, The Journal of Finance, 
54:.6;2241 
Grant K., and Marshall A.P., 1997, Large UK Companies and Derivatives, European 
financial Management, 3:2, 191-208 
Greene W., 2002, The Bias of the Fixed Effects Estimator in Nonlinear Models, New 
York University, Working paper 
Goldberg, S.R., Godwin J.H., Kim M., and Tritschler C.A., 1998, On the Determinants 
of Corporate Usage of Financial Derivatives, Journal of International Financial 
Management and Accounting, 9: 2, 132-166 
Gregory W. B., Peter R. C. and David H., 2006, Are Firms Successful at Selective 
Hedging? Journal of Business, 79, 6 
Gordon, B. and Gebhardt G, 1998, Derivatives Usage in Risk Management by U.S. 
and German non-Financial Firms: A Comparative Survey, Journal of International 
Financial Management & Accounting, 10:3, 153 
Guay W., 1999, The Sensitivity of CEO Wealth to Equity Risk: an Analysis of the 
Magnitude and Determinants; Journal of Financial Economics, 53, 43 
Guay, W. and Kothari S. P., 2003, How Much do Firms Hedge with Derivatives, 
Journal of Financial Economics, 70, 423-461 
Guay, W., 1999, The Impact of Derivatives on Firm Risk: An Empirical Examination 
of New Derivatives Users, Journal of Accounting & Economics 26, 319-351 
Hagelin, N., 2003, Why Firms Hedge With Currency Derivatives: An Examination of 
Transaction and Translation Exposure, Applied Financial Economics, 13, 55-69 
Harry L. W., 1984, Exchange Rate Risk and the Multinational Firm, Doctor 
Dissertation, Texas A&M University 
53 
Han, L.-M, 1996, Managerial Compensation and Corporate Demand for Insurance, 
Journal of Risk and Insurance 63:3, 381-404 
Haushalter, G.D. 2000, Financing Policy, Basis Risk, and Corporate Hedging: 
Evidence from Oil and Gas Producers, Journal of Finance 55:1, 107-152 
Hentschel, L., and Kothari S.P., 2001, Are Corporations Reducing or Taking Risk with 
Derivatives? Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 36, 93-118 
Howton, S.D., and Perfect S.B., 1998, Currency and Interest-Rate Derivatives Use in 
US firms, Financial Management, 27:4, 111-121 
Hull J., 1997, Options, Futures and Other Derivatives (4th Edition), Prentice Hall, 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ 
Hull J„ 2002, Options, Futures and Other Derivatives (5th Edition), Prentice Hall, 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ 
Hunter D., 2005, Time-Varying Exchange Rate Exposure of Small and Large Firms, 
University of South Florida, Unpublished Manuscript 
Ian H. G., 2006, The Corporate Hedging Process, Adapted from an Article Published 
by Bank of Montreal, New York University 
Jalilvand A., 1999, Why Firms Use Derivatives: Evidence from Canada, Canadian 
Journal of Administrative Sciences, 16:3; 213 
Jay B.S. and Satchidananda S. S., 2006, Comparing Decision Trees with Logistic 
Regression for Credit Risk Analysis, Working Paper 
Jensen, M.C., and Meckling W.H., 1976, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305-360 
Jin, Y. and Jorion P., 2006, Firm Value and Hedging: Evidence from U.S. Oil and Gas 
Producers, The Journal of Finance, 61:2 
Jorion P., 1990, The Exchange Rate Exposure of U.S. Multinationals, Journal of 
Business, 63,331-345. 
.Judge, A. P., 2005, Hedging and the Use of Derivatives: Evidence from UK 
Non-financial Firms, Middlesex University, Discussion Paper 
54 
Kedia S. and Abon M., 2003, Foreign Currency Denominated Debt: An Empirical 
investigation, Journal of Business, 76: 4, 521-546 
Keloharju M, and Mervi N., 2001, Why Do Firms Raise Foreign Currency 
Denominated Debt? Evidence from Finland, European Financial Management, 7:4, 
481-496 
Kesten C, G. and Scott A J., 2005, Competitor-oriented Objectives: The Myth of 
Market Share, International Journal of Business, forthcoming 
Klaus, S., 2003. Hedging Foreign Exchange Risks: Theories and Evidence, Working 
Paper 
Knopf J. D; Nam J. and Thornton J. H, 2002, The Volatility and Price Sensitivities of 
Managerial Stock Option Portfolios and Corporate Hedging; The Journal of Finance, 
57:2, 801 
Kim, D. K., 2002, Two Essays on Managerial Incentives and Corporate Decisions, 
Ph.D., University of South Carolina, 70 
Lang, L. and Stulz R., 1994, Tobin's Q, Corporate Diversification and Firm 
Performance, Journal of Political Economy, 102, 1248-1280 
La Porta, R, Lopez~de-Silanes F., Shleifer A., and Vishny R.W., 1998. Law and 
Finance, Journal of Political Economy, 106:6, 1113-1155 
La Porta, R, Lopez-de-Silanes F., and Shleifer A., 1999, Corporate Ownership around 
the World, Journal of Finance, 54:2, 471-517 
Lei U., 2002, Corporate Hedging Policy around the World, Working Paper 
Lee M., 1995, Semi-Parametric Estimation of Simultaneous Equations with Limited 
Dependant Variables: a Case Study of Female Labor Supply, Journal of Applied 
econometrics, 10, 187 
Lei and H., 1998, Agency Costs, Risk Management, and Capital Structure, The Journal 
of Finance, 53: 4, 1213 
Lim S., and Heli C. W., 2001, Stakeholder Firm-Specific Investments, Financial 
Fledging, and Corporate Diversification, Ohio State University, Working Paper 
55 
Lorrain, F. and Harrison W,, 1971, Structural Equivalence of Individuals in Social 
Networks, Journal of Mathematical Sociology, 1, 49-80 
Loderer, C. and Pichler K., 2000, Firms, Do You Know your Currency Risk Exposure? 
Survey results, Journal of Empirical Finance, 7: 317-344 
MacMinn, R. and James G., 2000, On Corporate Insurance, in Handbook of Insurance, 
Georges Dionne (Ed.), Kluwer Academic Publishers, 541-564. 
MacMinn, R.D., 1987, Insurance and Corporate Risk Management, Journal of Risk and 
Insurance, 54:4, 658-677. 
Maddala G.S., 1991, Limited Dependant and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics, 
Cambridge University Press 
Madura j . , 1993, Coping with Exchange Rate Risk, Business Credit, ABI/INFORM 
Global, 95:9,22 
MacKay P. and Phillips G.., 2003, How Does Industry Affect Firm Financial Structure, 
Working Paper 
Marston R. C , 2001, The Effects of Industry Structure on Economic Exposure, 
\ of International Money and Finance, forthcoming 
Matthew, S. B., 2003, The Diffusion of the Sixth-Generation Processor in the Global 
Computer Industry, Competition and Social Influence, 108: 6, 1175-1210 
Mayers, D., and Smith C.W., 1982, On the Corporate Demand for Insurance, Journal 
of Business 55:2,281-296 
Mayers, D., and Smith C.W., Jr. 1987, Corporate Insurance and the Underinvestment 
Problem, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 54:1, 45-54 
Mian. S.L. 1996, Evidence on Corporate Hedging Policy, Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis 31:3: 419-439. 
Michael D. G., 2006, Industry Competition and Total Factor Productivity Growth, U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, BLS Working Paper 
Michelle A., 1999, Foreign Currency Exposure: Hedging Options, Journal of Practical 
Global Business 
56 
Miller M. H., and Franco M., 1961, Dividend Policy, Growth, and the Valuation of 
Shares, Journal of Business, 34, 411-433 
Modigliani F,, and Merton H. M., 1958, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and 
the Theory of Investment, American Economic Review, 48, 261-297 
Moreilec E, and Smith C. W. Jr, 2002, Investment Policy, Financial Policies, and the 
Control of the Agency Conflicts, The Bradley Policy Research Center, Working Paper, 
02, 16 
Morck R. and Yeung B., 1991, Why Investors Value Multinationality, Journal of 
Business, 64, 165-187 
Myers S.C., 1977, Determinants of Corporate Borrowing, Journal of Financial 
Economics, 5, 147-175. 
Myers S.C, 1984, The Capital Structure Puzzle, Journal of Finance, 39:3, 575-592 
Myers S.C, 1993, Still Searching for Optimal Capital Structure, The Revolution in 
Corporate Finance. Basil Blackwell, New York, NY, 91-99 
Myers S., and Majluf N., 1984, Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions when 
Firms Have Information that Investors do not Have, Journal of Financial Economics, 
13,187-221 
Nance D., Smith C, and Smithson C, 1993, On the Determinants of Corporate 
Hedging, The Journal of Finance, 48, 267-284 
Nicholas C, Mila G., Shane M H., Andrew W L., 2006, Do Hedge Funds Increase 
Systemic Risk? Economic Review - Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 91:4, 49-77 
Norbert A... Why Hedge?- A Critical Review of Theory and Empirical Evidence, ZEW -
Zentrum fur Europaische Wirtschaftsforschung International Finance and Financial 
Management, L 7,1,D-68161 Mannheim 
Oiga 1. and Darren H. M., 2001, Factors Affecting Hedging Decisions Using 
Evidence from the Cotton Industry, Paper presented at the NCR-134 Conference on 
Applied Commodity Price Analysis, Forecasting, and Market Risk Management 
Pclizman S., 1977, The Gains and Losses from Industrial Concentration, Journal of 
Law and Economics, 20, 229-263 
57 
PantzaHs C, Betty J, S., and Paul L., 2001, Operational Hedges and the Foreign 
Exchange Exposure of U.S. Multinational Corporations, Journal of International 
Business Studies, 32, 793-812 
Paul S., Ian S. and Andrew S., 2005, To Hedge or Not, Finance & Investment 
Conference, 19-21 
Pennings, J.M.E., and Leuthold R.M., 2000, The Role of Farmers' Behavioral 
Attitudes and Heterogeneity in Futures Contracts Usage, American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics, 82: 908-919 
Petersen ML A. and Thiagarajan R., 2000, Risk Measurement and Hedging: with and 
without Derivatives, Financial Management; 5 
Peter M., Gordon M. P., 2003, How Does Industry Affect Firm Financial Structure, 
Southern Methodist University, University of Maryland and NBER, Working Paper 
Phillips A. L., 1995, 1995 Derivatives Practices and Instruments Survey, Financial 
Management, 24: 2, 115-125 
Rawls S.W., and Smithson C.W., 1990, Strategic Risk Management, Journal of 
Applied Corporate Finance, 2:4, 6-18. 
Rajgopal S., Shevlin T., 1999, Stock Option Compensation and Risk Taking: The Case 
of Oil and Gas Producers, University of Washington, Working Paper 
Raj an R. and Luigi Z., 1995, What Do We Know about Capital Structure? Some 
Evidence from International Data, Journal of Finance, 50: 5, 1421-1460 
Rajgopal S. and Shevlin T., 2002, Empirical Evidence on the Relation between Stock 
Option Compensation and Risk Taking, Journal of Accounting & Economics, 33:2, 
145 
Richard D. P., David C. J. and Stephen D. S., 1996, Corporate Hedging in the 
Insurance Industry: The Use of Financial Derivatives by US Insurers, Financial 
institutions Center 
Richard C. M., 2001> The Effects of Industry Structure on Economic Exposure, Journal 
of International Money and Finance, 20 , 149-164 
Ross M. P., 1996, Corporate Hedging: What, Why and How? University of. California 
at Berkeley, Working Paper 
58 
Ross S., 1997, the Determination of Financial Structure: the Incentive Signaling 
Approach, Bell Journal of Economics, 8, 23-40 
Rogers D. A., 2002, Does Executive Portfolio Structure Affect Risk Management? 
CEO Risk-Taking Incentives and Corporate Derivatives Usage, Journal of Banking & 
Finance, 26:2,271 
Schrand C, and Unal H,, 1998, Hedging and Coordinated Risk Management: Evidence 
from Thrift Conversions, Journal of Finance, 53:3, 979-1015 
Servaes H. 1996, The Value of Diversification During the Conglomerate Merger Wave, 
Journal of Finance, 51, 1201-1225 
Shapiro A.C., and Titman, S. S., 1986, An Integrated Approach to Corporate Risk 
Management, The Revolution in Corporate Finance, Basil Blackwell, New York, NY, 
215-229. 
Shapiro A. C , 2002, Multinational Financial Management, 7th edition, Prentice Hall 
Shapiro B.I., and Brorsen B.W., 1988, Factors Influencing Farmers= Decisions of 
Whether or Not to Hedge, North Central Journal of Agricultural Economics 10, 
145-53. 
Shmuel O. and Yumi O., 2007, Optimal Static Hedging of Volumetric Risk in a 
Competitive Wholesale Electricity Market, University of California, Working Paper 
Smith C. and Watts R., 1992, The Investment Opportunity Set and Corporate 
Financing, Dividend, and Compensation Policies, Journal of Financial Economics, 32, 
263-292 
Srnsth C.W., and Stulz R.M., 1985, The Determinants of Firms' Hedging Policies, 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 20:4, 391-405 
Smith C.W., Jr. 1995, Corporate Risk Management: Theory and Practice, Journal of 
Derivatives. 2:4, 21-30 
Stulz R.lvl, 1984, Optimal Hedging Policies, Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis. 19:2, 127-140 
Stulz R.M., 1990, Managerial Discretion and Optimal Hedging Policies, Journal of 
59 
Financial Economics, 26:1, 3 
Stuiz R.M., 1996, Rethinking Risk Management, Bank of America Journal of Applied 
Corporate Finance, 9, 8 
Stuiz R.M., 2002, Derivatives, Risk Management and Financial Engineering, 
Southwestern College, Working Paper 
Tai M.„ 1998, Additional Evidence on the Determinants of Hedging: The Case of 
Taiwan Journal of Financial Studies, National Sun Yat-sen University, 6:2, 49-63 
Ted R., Jessica C. and Martin F., The Gold Hedge Indicator, Alchemist Issue 31 
Febrero, 1996, A Survey of Corporate Risk Management: Too hot to handle? - The art 
of risk-spreading, The Economist 
Tinio P, 2004, Hedging with Credit Derivatives and its Strategic Role in Banking 
Competition, University Augsburg, Working Paper 
Thouraya T., 2005, Research on Corporate Hedging Theories: A Critical Review of the 
Evidence to Date, Department of Finance and Canada Research Chair in Risk 
Management, HEC Montreal, Working paper 
Titman S, and Wessels R., 1988, The Determinants of Capital Structure Choice, The 
Journal of Finance, 43:1, 1 
Tim A., Sudipto D., Sheridan T., 2005, Financial Constraints, Competition and 
Hedging in Industry Equilibrium, Journal of Finance, forthcoming 
Torn C. and Yash J. M., 1995, How to Evaluate Corporate FX Risk Management 
Programs, Working Paper 
Tronstad R., 1991, The Effects of Firm Size and Production Cost Levels on 
Dynamically Optimal after-tax Cotton Storage and Hedging Decisions, Southern 
Journal of Agricultural Economics, 165-179. 
Tufa/no P., 1996, Who Manages Risk? An Empirical Examination of Risk Management 
Practices in the Gold Mining Industry; The Journal of Finance, 51:.4, 1097 
Tufano P., 1998, The Determinants of Stock Price Exposure: Financial Engineering 
and The Gold Mining Industry, The Journal of Finance, LIII, 3 
60 
Turvey C.G., and Baker T.G., 1989, Optimal Hedging under Alternative Capital 
Structures and Risk Aversion, Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics, 37, 
135-143 
Turvey C. G., and Baker T.G., 1990, A Farm-Level Financial Analysis of Farmers' 
Use of Futures and Options Under Alternative Farm Programs, American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics, 72, 946-957 
Turvey C, G., 1989, The Relationship between Hedging with Futures and the 
Financing Function of Farm Management, Canadian Journal of Agricultural 
Economics, 37, 629-638. 
Warner J., 1977, Bankruptcy Costs: Some Evidence, Journal of Finance, 32, 337-348 
Wong F., 2000, The Association between SFAS No. 119 Derivatives Disclosures and 
the Foreign Exchange Risk Exposure of Manufacturing Firms, Journal of Accounting 
Research, 38, 387-417. 
Wysocki P., 1995, Determinants of Foreign Exchange Derivatives Use by U.S. 
Corporations: An Empirical Investigation, University of Rochester, Working paper 
Wysocki P., 1996, Managerial Motives and Corporate Use of Derivatives: Some 
Evidence, University of Rochester, Working paper 
Yermack, D., 1996. Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of 
directors, Journal of Financial Economics, 40, 185-211 
Yanbo J. and Philippe J., Firm Value and Hedging: Evidence from U.S. Oil and Gas 
Producers, The Journal of Finance, LXI, 2 
Young S. K., Ike M., and Jouahn N., 2003, Is Operational Hedging a Substitute 
for or Complement to Financial Hedging? Journal of Corporate Finance, 
forthcoming, 
Zhen W., 2006, Research Proposal on How does the Hedging Behavior of 
Competitors Affect a Firm's Own Decision to Hedge? Concordia University, 
Research Proposal 
61 
Table 1 Possible Effects of the Interaction between Industry Hedging and 
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Table 3 Descriptive Statistics of Foreign Exchange Hedging Activity 
Disclosures 
This table reports summary descriptive statistics (mean, median and standard deviation) 
of the variables used in the regression analysis. It presents data on the final complete 
data sample of 383 companies in the S&P 1500. The research time period is 3 years, 
from 2003 to 2005. All data are from 10-K disclosures. All values are in millions of 
dollar, 
Panel A provides descriptive statistics on 152 large cap firms in the S&P 500 Large-Cap 
Index, A firm is defined as a foreign exchange hedger if it provides a qualitative 
disclosure of any foreign currency hedging activity in its annual report. Panel B 
presents descriptive statistics on 96 median cap firms in the S&P 400 Mid Cap Index. 
Panel € presents descriptive statistics on 135 small cap firms in the S&P 600 Small Cap 
index 
'•< -<iA •-» Descriptive Statistics for Large Caps 
1 
1
 i [ledgers 
Sample Size 
Percentage of Hedgers 
Mean of Notional 
Amount of Derivatives 
used for Hedging 
($ millions) 
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Amount of Derivatives 
used for Hedging 
($ millions) 
Standard Deviation of 
"Notional Amount of 

























Panel B Descriptive Statistics for Median Caps 
1 ^C«J 
Number of Hedgers 
Sample Size 
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Panel C Descriptive Statistics for Small Caps 
Year 
Number of Hedgers 
Sample Size 
Percentage of Hedgers 
Mean of Notional 
Amount of Derivatives 
used for Hedging 
($ millions) 
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Amount of Derivatives 
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Standard Deviation of 
Notional Amount of 

























Table 4 Descriptive Statistics of Firm Characteristics 2003-2005 
The table reports the descriptive statistics of firm characteristics over the period 
2003-2005, All variables are in dollar millions and defined in Table 2. All data are from 
10-K disclosures. Means, medians, and standard deviations are reported. 
Panel A provides firm characteristics data on 152 large caps firms in the S&P 500 
Large-Cap Index. Panel B presents firm characteristics data on 96 median caps firms in 
the S&P 400 Mid Cap Index. Panel C presents firm characteristics data on 135 small 
caps firms in the S&P 600 Small Cap Index. 














































































































Panel B Firm Characteristics of Median Cap Firms 
2003 
Control 
Variables Symbol Mean Median 
Firm Size 

























! 1 ! 
DISTRESS j 222.24 j 56.59 
i 1 
j 
INFOASY j 24.49 21.43 
i 
i 
UN1NVF.S I 0.07 0.03 
1 ! 
j | 



































































($US mil) SIZ 
Tax Schedule 
(%) TAX 
































































































Table 5 OLS Regression with FX Derivative Use and Firm Value for Large Cap 
The Tabic displays the results by estimating OLS regressions for a sample of 152 large 
caps firms in the S&P 500 Large-Cap Index. The dependent variable is Tobin's Q, 
which is calculated as the market value of total assets to book value. INDHEDGACT 
presents the number of firms in an industry that use hedging divided by the total 
number of firms in that industry. P-values shown in boldface indicate that the 
corresponding coefficients of the regression are statistically significant at the 95% 
confidence level. 
VALUE = f (FOREIGN, INDHEDGACT, DEGREE, (INDHEDGACT -
INDHEDGACT AVERAGE) * (DEGREE-DEGREE AVERAGE), (DEGREE-DEGREE 
.AVERAGE) * (FOREIGN-FOREIGN AVERAGE), SIZE, PROFIT, GROWTH, 
LEVERAGE, TIME) 
Dependent Variable: TOB!N_Q 
Method: Least 
















































Mean of dependent 
Variable 





















L)SL Regression with FX Derivative Use and Firm Value for Median Cap 
£ irais 
The table displays the results by estimating OLS regressions for a sample of 96 median 
caps firms in the S&P 400 Mid Cap Index. The dependent variable is Tobin's Q, which 
is calculated as the market value of total assets to book value. INDHEDGACT presents 
the number of firms in an industry that use hedging divided by the total number of 
firms in that industry. P-values shown in boldface indicate that the corresponding 
coefficients of the regression are statistically significant at the 95% confidence level 
VALUE = f (FOREIGN, INDHEDGACT, DEGREE, (INDHEDGACT -
INDHEDGACT AVERAGE) * (DEGREE-DEGREE AVERAGE), (DEGREE-DEGREE 
AVERAGE) *(FOREIGN-FOREIGN AVERAGE), SIZE, PROFIT, GROWTH, 
LEVERAGE, TIME) 
Dependent Variable: TOBiN_Q 
Method: Least Squares 
















































Mean of dependent 
Variable 





















Table 7 OLS Regression with FX 'Derivative Use and Firm Value for Small Caps 
The Table displays the results by estimating OLS regressions for a sample of 135 small 
caps firms in the S&P 600 Small Cap Index. The dependent variable is Tobin's Q, 
which is calculated as the market value of total assets to book value. INDHEDGACT 
presents the number of firms in an industry that use hedging divided by the total 
number of firms in that industry. P-values shown in boldface indicate that the 
corresponding coefficients of the regression are statistically significant at the 95% 
confidence level 
VALUE = f (FOREIGN, INDHEDGACT, DEGREE, (INDHEDGACT -
INDHEDGACT AVERAGE) * (DEGREE-DEGREE AVERAGE), (DEGREE-DEGREE 
AVERAGE) * (FOREIGN-FOREIGN AVERAGE), SIZE, PROFIT, GROWTH, 
LEVERAGE. TIME) 
Dependent Variable: Q 
Method: Least Squares 














































Mean of dependent 
Variable 





















Table 8 Logit Estimates of the Likelihood of FX Hedging for Large Caps 
This table shows logit regression estimates of how the extent of hedging in an industry 
affects a firm's decision to hedge. The dependent variable is a hedging dummy that 
equals one if the firm does not disclose the use of foreign currency derivatives and zero 
otherwise. The extent of hedging in an industry is measured as the number of hedgers 
divided by the total number of firms in the industry. P-values shown in boldface 
indicate that the corresponding coefficients of the regression are statistically significant 
at the 95% confidence level. 
DUMH = f (INDHEDGACT, FOREIGN, FOREIGN * INDHEDGACT, TAX, 
SUBS, SIZE, UNINVST. DISTRESS, MANGINC, FNFOASY) 
Dependent Variable: DUMH 
Method: ML - Binary Probit 
(Quadratic hili climbing) 
included observations: 449 
Covariance matrix computed 












Mean of dependent variable 
Standard Error of regression 
Log likelihood 
Observations with Dependents 




























Standard Deviation of 
Dependent Variable 




























Table 9 Logit Estimates of the Likelihood of FX Hedging for Median Caps 
This table shows logit regression estimates of how the extent of hedging in an industry 
affects a firm's decision to hedge. The dependent variable is a hedging dummy that 
equals one if the firm does not disclose the use of foreign currency derivatives and zero 
otherwise. The extent of hedging in an industry is measured as the number of hedgers 
divided by the total number of firms in the industry. P-values shown in boldface 
indicate that the corresponding coefficients of the regression are statistically significant 
at the 95% confidence level. 
DUMH = f (INDHEDGACT, FOREIGN, FOREIGN * INDHEDGACT, TAX, 
SUBS, SIZE, UNINVST, DISTRESS, MANGINC, INFOASY) 
Dependent Variable: DUMH 
Method: ML - Binary Probit 
(Quadratic hi!! climbing) 
included observations: 285 
Covariance matrix computed 












! Mean of dependent variable 
| Standard Error of regression 
! Log likelihood 
Observations with Dependents 




























Standard Deviation of 
Dependent Variable 




























Table 10 Logit Estimates of the Likelihood of FX Hedging for Small Caps 
This table shows logit regression estimates of how the extent of hedging in an industry 
affects a firm's decision to hedge. The dependent variable is a hedging dummy that 
equals one if the firm does not disclose the use of foreign currency derivatives and zero 
otherwise. The extent of hedging in an industry is measured as the number of hedgers 
divided by the total number of firms in the industry. P-values shown in boldface 
indicate that the corresponding coefficients of the regression are statistically significant 
at the 95% confidence level 
DUMH = f (INDHEDGACT, FOREIGN, FOREIGN * INDHEDGACT, TAX, 
SUBS, SIZE, UNINVST, DISTRESS, MANGINC, INFOASY) 
Dependent Variable: DUMH 
Method: ML - Binary Logit 
(Quadratic hill ciimbing) 
Induced observations: 396 
Covariance matrix computed 













j .Mean of dependent variable 
| Standard Error of regression 
I Log likelihood 
Observations with Dependents 




























Standard Deviation of 
Dependent Variable 




























Table 11: Possible Effects of the Interaction between Industry Hedging and Firm 
Hedging upon Firm Value using Alternative Method: 
According to the requirements of the committee members, another methodology is 
used to test possible effects of the interaction on firm value 
Interaction Variables=l if (Degree-Degree Average)*(Industry-Industry Average) >0 
Interaction Variables=0 if (Degree-Degree Average)*(Industry-Industry Average) <0 
As the results of the regression of firm value upon the relevant variables show, the coefficient of 





















Pane! A: Results for large cap firms: 
Dependent Variable: TOBINJJ 
Method: Least Squares 













































Panel B: Results for median cap firms: 
| Dependent Variable: T0BIN_Q 
Method: Least Squares 














































Panel C: Results for small cap finus: 
Dopendent Variable: Q 
Meihod: Least Squares 
Sample: 1 396 
Variable 
C 
FOREIGN 
DEGREE 
INTERACTION 
SiZE 
PROFIT 
GROWTH 
LEVERAGE 
j YEAR03 
| YEARO-1 
Coefficient 
7.069038 
-0. 99896 
0.045831 
-0.0103 
-1.89429 
4. 624558 
3. 808569 
0.000393 
0.086094 
0.116393 
Std. Error 
0.483526 
0.25537 
0.030272 
0.134266 
0.171395 
0.564211 
0.63902 
0.000371 
0.141072 
0.139692 
Prob. 
0 
0. 0001 
0. 1309 
0. 9389 
0 
0 
0 
0. 2908 
0.542 
0. 4052 
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